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Abstract 
Some theories predict that exchange rate bubbles should deflate faster than they inflate. We find no empirical support 
for this hypothesis for currencies that floated against the US dollar. The bursting of exchange rate bubbles is not 
analogous to collapses in the prices of financial assets. Financial asset prices tend to fall faster than they rise, which 
suggests that the same might be true of relatively risky currencies. We find no evidence that other currencies 
depreciate faster against the US dollar than they appreciate, even though the US dollar is commonly regarded as a 
potential safe-haven currency. This is true even of emerging-market currencies.
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     1. Introduction 
 
Do exchange rate bubbles deflate faster than they inflate?  This is a prediction of the 
behavioural finance model of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006), in which there are two 
groups of traders – fundamentalists and chartists.  Fundamentalists expect the exchange 
rate to move back towards their estimate of the equilibrium rate, whereas chartists (or 
technical analysts) are momentum traders who believe that the exchange rate will 
continue to move in the same direction.  The actual movement of the exchange rate is 
equal to a weighted average of the two groups’ expectations plus a stochastic element.  
The model has various other features, including the fact that the relative weight of the 
two groups in the market varies according to their recent profitability.  In the model, 
bubbles deflate faster than they inflate because, in the inflation phase, fundamentalists 
expect the inflation of the bubble to be reversed, and this slows down the movement 
away from equilibrium, whereas in the deflation phase both sets of traders expect 
movement towards equilibrium (the chartists because it is an extrapolation of the recent 
trend) and this speeds up the deflation process.
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In this paper we perform an empirical test of the hypothesis that the dollar real (CPI-
adjusted) exchange rates of various currencies move away from equilibrium more slowly 
than they move back towards it. 
 
It is tempting to draw an analogy between exchange rate bubbles and stock market 
bubbles.  In fact De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006, p. 186) refer explicitly to this analogy 
when they state that the fact that “bubbles start gradually and build up speed, while 
crashes occur suddenly” is a “pervasive feature of bubbles in financial markets”.  In the 
next section we show that the analogy between stock market crashes and the bursting of 
exchange rate bubbles is a false one. 
 
2.  Stock market bubbles and exchange rate bubbles 
 
In general, stock markets tend to fall more rapidly than they rise (Bekaert and Wu, 2000; 
French et al., 1987; Yuan, 2005).  Various explanations of this have been suggested.  One 
is the role of leverage (Christie, 1982).  When the price of a firm’s stock falls, it becomes 
more leveraged, and therefore riskier.  A given piece of news therefore stimulates larger 
price movements, increasing price volatility.  A second possibility is that the equity risk 
premium is a function of the predicted volatility of stock prices, and since volatility is 
strongly positively autocorrelated, an unanticipated volatility shock stimulated by a big 
piece of news raises anticipated volatility and therefore depresses prices. If the news is 
negative, the volatility effect enhances the negative impact of the news on prices; if the 
news is positive, it works against the news effect, so big shocks have a larger price effect 
if negative than if positive (French et al., 1987).  Finally, Yuan (2005) presents a model 
in which some investors have private information, but face borrowing constraints when 
                                                 
1 An earlier model of a similar type, with similar predictions, is that of Frankel and Froot (1990).  See 
Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) for a recent survey of technical analysis in the foreign exchange market. 
  1asset prices are lower (e.g. because lenders require more collateral or because of fund 
redemptions).  Without borrowing constraints, all the private information is conveyed to 
uninformed investors through asset prices, but with these constraints uninformed 
investors do not know whether low prices reflect private information or constraints on the 
informed investors.  Because the constraints tighten as prices fall, prices are more volatile 
when low. 
 
Do these theories carry over to the foreign exchange market? There seem to be two major 
differences.  One is that all the above explanations refer to the price of a risky asset 
relative to a safe asset.  In the foreign exchange market, however, it is unclear that one 
currency is intrinsically safer than another.  One might perhaps argue that investors are 
interested in their net wealth measured in their home currency, so that wealthy countries’ 
currencies are intrinsically safer.  This argument would suggest that a currency such as 
the US dollar is a safe haven that should rise faster than it falls, as investors flee riskier 
currencies.  In that case the spectacular crashes should be experienced by risky 
currencies, and not by the US dollar.  Yet De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006, pp. 2-3) cite 
the falls in the US dollar in 1985-87 and 2002-04 as their main examples of deflating 
bubbles. 
 
The second difference is that these explanations do not interpret stock market crashes as a 
return to equilibrium.  Prices are not closer to equilibrium after the crash than before.  
The first two explanations (leverage and a time-varying equity risk premium) are 
essentially equilibrium theories – prices are not assumed to deviate from equilibrium at 
any point.  In Yuan’s (2005) theory, prices can deviate from the level that would prevail 
in the absence of borrowing constraints on informed investors, but this tends to happen 
most when prices are low. Consequently, if the borrowing constraint effect is interpreted 
as a disequilibrium phenomenon, then a price crash is a movement away from 
equilibrium rather than towards it. 
 
Thus there are two reasons to reject the analogy between stock market crashes and the 
bursting of exchange rate bubbles. One is that stock market crashes are not obviously a 
return to equilibrium; the other is that the bursting of exchange rate bubbles is not 
necessarily a rush for safer assets, particularly where the exchange rate involved is that of 




3. Empirical  specification 
 
In order to test whether exchange rate bubbles deflate faster than they inflate, we test 
whether the propensity of the real exchange rate to move in the same direction is stronger 
when it is moving back towards the mean of the series than when it is moving away from 
it.  We also allow for possible reversion of the real exchange rate to an equilibrium that 
may be subject to a time trend.  Thus our estimating equation is: 
 
t t t t t t t s s s s s s ε φ δ γ β α + + ∆ − + ∆ + + = ∆ − − − −
2
1 1 1 1 ) (      (1) 
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where s is the logarithm of the real (CPI-adjusted) exchange rate of the US dollar against 
another currency (an increase representing an appreciation of the US dollar), t is time, ε is 
a random error and ∆ is the first-difference operator.  The intuition is that if bubbles 
deflate faster than they inflate, δ will be negative, because the effective coefficient of 
 is  1 − ∆ t s ) ) ( ( 1 1 − − ∆ − + t t s s s δ γ .  The second part of this expression will be positive in the 
case of a movement towards equilibrium and negative in the case of a movement away 
from equilibrium, if δ is negative. 
 
We may also test whether the US dollar, as a presumed safe-haven currency, appreciates 
faster than it depreciates, which is the closest analogy to the observation that stock 
markets fall faster than they rise. Let z be equal to one if  , 0 1 > ∆ − t s  and zero otherwise.  
Then the equation to be estimated is: 
 
t t t t t t s z s s s ε φ η γ β α + + ∆ + ∆ + + = ∆ − − − 1 1 1       ( 2 )  
 
If the US dollar appreciates faster than it depreciates, then η should be positive, since the 
effective coefficient of   is γ when the dollar is depreciating and γ+η when the dollar 
is appreciating. 
1 − ∆ t s
 
 
4.  Results 
 
Table I shows the results of some empirical tests of equation (1), using end-of-month 
exchange rates against the US dollar, converted to real rates using consumer price 
indices.  It can be seen that, although δ is negative in four out of six cases, it is never 
significant at the 5% level, which implies that bubbles do not have any tendency to inflate 
more slowly (or faster) than they deflate. 
  3Table I. Do bubbles deflate faster than they inflate? 
 
 Canada  UK  Germany  Italy Japan  Australia NZ 
              









































































0.019 0.031 0.037    0.032 0.33  0.032 0.036 
Adjusted R
2 -0.002 0.019  0.046  0.025  0.010  0.010 0.002 
Notes.  The model estimated is equation (1).  Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  * (**) denotes 
significant at the 0.05 (0.01) level.  The sample is 1980/01 to 1998/12 for Germany and Italy; 1980/01 to 
2008/10 for the other countries.  The base currency is the US dollar in each case.  A rise in s represents a 




Table II. Does the US dollar appreciate faster than it depreciates? 
 
 Canada  UK  Germany Italy  Japan  Australia  NZ 
        










































































0.019 0.031 0.037 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.036 
Adj. R
2 0.010 0.019 0.036 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 
Notes.  The model estimated is equation (2).  Otherwise see notes to Table I 
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Table II shows a test of the safe-haven hypothesis for the same currencies. Since a rise in 
s represents an appreciation of the US dollar, the safe-haven hypothesis predicts that η 
should be positive. In fact it turns out to be negative in five cases out of six. 
 
It may be that the safe-haven hypothesis does not apply to these currencies because they 
are not risky enough. In Table III we apply the hypothesis to the currencies of some 
middle-income countries which were classified as independently floating for all or nearly 
all of the period concerned (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Korea, Mexico, South Africa), but 
























       
































































0.053 0.032 0.034 0.033 0. 029 0.048 
Adj. R
2 0.018 0.041 0.050 0.054 0.042  0.0300 
Notes.  The model estimated is equation (2). Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  * (**) denotes 
significant at the 0.05 (0.01) level.  The sample is determined by the period over which each currency was 
independently floating according to the IMF classification.  The base currency is the US dollar in each case.  
A rise in s represents a real appreciation of the US dollar. 
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5.  Conclusions 
 
Some theories suggest that exchange rate bubbles inflate faster than they deflate.  In this 
paper we have tested this hypothesis using data on real bilateral rates against the US 
dollar for six OECD countries.  The results do not support the hypothesis. 
 
In other financial markets the prices of risky assets are observed to fall faster than they 
rise.  In the context of the foreign exchange market, this would suggest that safe-haven 
currencies should appreciate faster than they depreciate, since they represent the 
relatively safe side of the currency transaction.  Safe-haven currencies are likely to be 
those where most investors are based and in which they measure their net wealth, such as 
the US dollar.  We find that, in contradiction of this hypothesis, against other OECD 
currencies the US dollar tends to appreciate more slowly than it depreciates, although the 
difference is not generally statistically significant.  Amonst the currencies of middle-
income countries which float, there is no systematic tendency for depreciation against the 
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